BASICS OF SECURITY SYSTEM DESIGN
3.1 Introduction. In a very real sense, the security system design process
is never-ending. The decision to implement a security program, regardless
of the subsystems or elements employed, is made out of the realization that
there is a threat which must be controlled. The process must continue
because of the dynamic and ever-changing nature of threats confronting U.S.
military facilities. The design process, therefore, first considers the
range of events potentially confronting the site or asset to be protected,
then considers what the consequences of loss or compromise would be and what
it might take to deter and prevent such events from occurring. Once
installed and operational, the user continues to focus on how the array of
threats is changing and how these changes might impact the countermeasures
now in place. Is the system capable of meeting these new circumstances?
This section focuses on a process that has proven to be both comprehensive
and easily adaptable to any design whether large or small. Depending upon
the complexity of the security mission, it can be extremely short in
duration or consume many man-months of effort. In every case, each of the
four basic phases should be followed sequentially as required by the unique
circumstances at each site.
3.2 Facility Categorization. Any comprehensive attempt to neatly categorize
all types of naval facilities into one listing that fits every application
would clearly fail. More importantly, it would overlook two critical
factors: first, each site is unique based upon a variety of local
circumstances and, second, the local activity may have justifiable concerns
for increased levels of security. The following discussion, therefore, is
necessarily general in scope, and each requirement of security
countermeasures must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis as determined by
"higher level" and local policy.
3.2.1 Factors Influencing System Design Criteria. There are several
factors which clearly influence the security system designer as he
approaches the requirements of each site. These include the following:
a) The specific requirements of DoD and Navy directives which
prescribe security countermeasures for various types of USN facilities,
activities, and assets. These directives are complemented by the specific
requirements for security laid down by activity commanders at shore-based
installations. While these countermeasures may be modified by waivers and
exceptions, availability of funds, or other resources or local
circumstances, they comprise a baseline from which to evaluate basic
security system capability requirements and other design criteria.
b) The sensitivity (criticality) of the asset(s) to be protected.
This is a basic element of impact or consequences analysis and focuses upon
the "what if" questions to a variety of event scenarios. The ultimate