importance to management; more costly construction and installation options
can often be rejected in favor of enhanced procedural controls or staffing.
Alternatively, the continuing cost of manpower can be offset through
correctly designed electronic subsystems. In the performance of the
resource analysis, an in-depth assessment of the physical environment also
needs to be completed. The presence of environmental attributes such as
seismic activity (both man-made or natural), radio frequency and
electromagnetic interference, weather conditions (rain, snow, fog, etc.),
physical condition of barriers, lighting, heating, ventilating, and
air-conditioning (HVAC), and other internal stimuli will contribute to later
potential consideration of electronic sensor siting. Failure to fully
evaluate these and related factors may completely negate the validity of
successive subsystem recommendations.
126.96.36.199.2 Threat Analysis. The analysis and resulting specification of a
design basis threat analysis is the responsibility of the Activity and
appropriate investigating elements such as NIS. Most importantly,
organizations must establish who the system is to deter, delay, and detect
and how they may be expected to attack the protected area. Without this
basic information, the remainder of the system design process may be
directed toward overdesigning or underdeveloping a solution that is
inappropriate to the real threat. Table 2 may be used as a generic guide in
developing a site-specific design basis threat for protected assets.
188.8.131.52.3 Preparation of Vulnerability Analysis. Initial steps in the
process have generated information on risk (exposure to hazard or loss) and
threat (the source of the risk). This information must now be used to
develop the focal point of the security system design: vulnerability
analysis. Vulnerability may be defined as the relative accessibility of the
area or item to be protected to specific risks or threats. As such,
successive system design tasks will first determine the range of potential
countermeasures which may be employed to remove or control these
vulnerabilities and eventually lead to a site-specific set of solutions.
The vulnerability analysis breaks out each asset, and given the adversary
characteristics established in the design basis threat documentation,
proceeds to a determination of the site capabilities to deter, delay,
detect, and respond to carrying out the postulated adversary sequence. This
is displayed conceptually in Figure 11. The vulnerability analysis asks the
question, "What physical and procedural countermeasures must be defeated by
the inside/outside adversary to successfully penetrate the protected area,
carry out the mission, and effectuate an escape?" Several potential
resources may exist to deter, detect, or delay entry at successive points.
The outsider, working alone or with other outsiders, is confronted with the
full range of subsystems incorporated in the security system. The insider
may possess the ability to bypass one or more of the subsystem elements.
Insider/outsider collusion threats require the full consideration of
redundancy, diversity, and the resulting defense-in-depth essential to
security system effectiveness. A prioritized matrix of consequences will
focus both the user and the system designer on specific vulnerabilities and
provide a foundation for later cost-benefit considerations. The resulting
analysis should be a focal point for discussion with the user, both to
sensitize him to issues which will require future management support as well
as to obtain consensus for direction in the early phases.