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 Section 8:
ALARM REPORTING AND DISPLAY
8.1 Intrusion Detection System Integration. The focal point of IDS
integration is at the alarm reporting and display location. Regardless of
the sophistication of the total system employed for facility protection
(from a simple local annunciator to a complex computerized display console),
all of the devices installed for remote detection, access control
assessment, and communication need to be terminated at a control point for
human interface and response. In many applications involving multiple
protected areas within a facility complex, the control network will be
comprised of a variety of local control units to gather communications from
card readers for access, alarm points for detection, and CCTV for
assessment, and transmit this data to a central console for command,
control, and communications with on- and/or off-site security response
resources. Much of the state-of-the-art commercial technology currently
on-line has been developed with these centralized control functions as
cost-effective requirements. While this manual does not propose the
integration of ancillary functions such as energy management and equipment
monitoring, Figure 50 displays the range of applications currently
available. The remainder of this section will discuss the basic issues,
options, and elements involved in this critical integration point of alarm
reporting and display.
8.2 Locating the Alarm Control Function. Many factors will influence
the decision of where to locate the intrusion detection system (IDS) alarm
control center. The vital nature of the knowledge of alarm events require
that the functions be protected from both natural disaster and physical
attack. These considerations of protection should be implemented following
a complete assessment of the vulnerabilities and requirements of the
facility and activity.
8.2.1 Threat Considerations. The degree of threat associated to the IDS
control system is considered to be as high as the highest identified threat
to any portion of the facility. This high degree of concern is a result of
the requirement to identify unauthorized intrusions and the probability of
failure in meeting this requirement if the alarm report processing system is
violated. The control center operations are considered to be vulnerable
from both insider and outsider attacks and the principal vulnerability of
the communication of event and alarm reporting which serves to provide
information for response and resolution to detected intrusions. These
apparent vulnerabilities can be diminished by using diverse termination
schemes, physical protection countermeasures at the control facility, and
duplicate control facilities (a primary and secondary control center with
fully redundant systems). Physical site restrictions and budgetary
considerations will also be major influences in the implementation of an
operationally sound and cost-effective control center.
8.2.2 Termination Options. Table 18 lists choices of the general
categories for reporting schemes. Each of the following options may be
more effective when combined with one or more of the other methods.
13.02-115
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