184.108.40.206 Facility shielding. Certain facilities, under certain conditions
(see NACSI 5004), may require a global shield to contain free space radiation
or suppress the EM environment at that location. To determine the amount of
shielding, an EMC survey and analysis should be performed. This analysis
should consider power density predictions or measurements, and equipment
susceptibility/radiation evaluations. Once the need for shielding has been
established, the shield should be constructed using guidance in MIL-HDBK-419
and specifications of NACSEM 5204. Most such shields will be six-sided.
220.127.116.11 Two-sided shields. In some facilities, a two-sided shielding
concept may be used. This would occur when TEMPEST approved equipment is
used exclusively. In reality, the shield is global, while the facility
construction is only two-sided. The facility entrance plate and the
equipotential ground plane comprise the two sides. Equipment cases, racks,
cabinets, conduits, and ducts comprise the remainder of the shield. If such
a configuration is used, the designer and installer must pay close attention
to good engineering and installation practices. These include:
Positive electrical integrity of all cases, cabinets, racks, conduits,
and wire ways through vigorous grounding and bonding.
Shield integrity and preservation by treatment or elimination of
Ensuring all panels, covers, and doors are properly installed and in
18.104.22.168 Utilities. All metal service pipes (e.g., water, steam, gas, sewer,
fuel, air) (see figure 50) will be bonded to the EESS prior to entrance into
the facility. This can be accomplished by attaching a No. 1/0 AWG stranded
copper wire to the pipe with an adequate clamp (see 5.6.2), and then
connecting the wire to the EESS. Where a facility entrance plate is used,
these pipes should be routed through the plate and circumferentially bonded
5.7 Security. Any facility which processes, transmits, stores, handles, or
otherwise manipulates classified information must be afforded security
commensurate with the level of classification of such material. The general
principles of the security for areas containing classified material are
contained in DoD, service, and agency directives and regulations. The
guidance contained herein establishes a common facility baseline for
facilities electronically processing information relative to the RED/BLACK
concept to provide the security to protect against signals intelligence
(SIGINT) and images intelligence (IMINT) exploitation. Some of this guidance
further decreases exploitation by human intelligence (HUMINT).
5.7.1 Physical security. A facility is divided into spaces and areas where
varying degrees of security are established and wherein specific operations
are permitted to exist (see figures 14 and 15). The concept may be
visualized as a pyramid, where each level of the pyramid takes classified
information further away from access by uncleared or unauthorized agents.
Each level then is a barrier to the next. These levels from bottom to top
represent the uncontrolled access area (UAA), the controlled space (CS), the
limited exclusion area (LEA), the BLACK equipment area (BEA), and the RED
equipment area (REA).
22.214.171.124 Uncontrolled access area (UAA). The UAA is that area external or
internal to a facility to which no controls for access are applied.
Typically, it refers to the general area outside a facility perimeter to