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MIL-HDBK-1013/12
E.3
Example Number 2:  Design Basis Threat Procedure.  This
example illustrates how an analyst would produce a design basis
threat for the assets presented in Example No. 1.  The example
begins with structure number 2 of Figure D-2.  Table E-3 and
Table E-4 present the analyst's actions for this example.
E.3.1
Background Information.  Use the following information
to compute likelihood ratings for the assets under consideration.
E.3.1.1
General.
Law enforcement is moderately effective.
E.3.1.2
Communications Equipment.  This asset has a limited
availability on the installation and is not available off the
installation.  It is operated 24 hours per day.  Communication
equipment is the target of two types of aggressors:  criminals
and saboteurs.
I.
Criminals
A.
Very low visibility within the facility.
B.
No incidents of theft on this installation or
at nearby installations.
C.
It is unlikely that there will be future
incidents.
D.
Would perceive a low possibility of success
and escape.
II.
Saboteurs
A.
Existence of equipment is probably known.
B.
Has moderate usefulness.
C.
No incidents of sabotage on this installation
or at nearby installations.
D.
It is unlikely that there will be future
incidents.
E.
Would perceive a low possibility of success
and escape.
E.3.1.3
Office Equipment.  This asset has high visibility.
Asset is widely available off the installation.  Office equipment
is the target of three types of aggressors:  unsophisticated
criminals, sophisticated criminals, and organized criminal
groups.
I.
Unsophisticated Criminals
A.
One incident of theft on this installation.
B.
Two incidents of thefts at nearby
installations.
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