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MIL-HDBK-1013/14
Section 4: TECHNICAL APPROACH
4.1
General. This handbook provides information that will lead the user through the
selection process to establish a physical barrier around any designated DOD restricted area.
Guidelines in MIL-HDBK-1013/10 should be used to establish minimum requirements for
perimeter barriers that can then be strengthened to counter possible attacks by explosive-laden
vehicles.
4.2
Selection and Design Issues. A systems approach is used for this handbook. The
principal issues that must be considered during the selection and design of a vehicle barrier include:
a) Threat Analysis. To quantify the potential threat. For example, a 15,000-pound
(6,818-kilogram) vehicle traveling at 40 miles per hour (64 kilometers per hour) laden with 1,000
pounds (454 kilograms) of explosives.
b) Performance. To determine the acceptable level of injury and damage. For example,
minor injuries from glass fragments and falling debris and damage to the peripheral walls are
acceptable, but progressive collapse must be prevented.
c) Access Control. Procedures for controlling barrier operations (manual or card
reader).
d) Requirements. Standoff distance to provide a level of protection compatible with
operational needs. Passive or active barrier systems to stop the threat vehicle. Such factors as
reliability and maintainability, sabotage and malfunction protection, safety, and cost effectiveness.
e) Response. Damage to the structure from blast loads developed during an explosion.
f) Liabilities. The effect potential liability could have on the decision to protect
personnel against the effects of a terrorist act.
4.3
Cost of Security. Physical security cost expenditures are generally based on the value of
the item to be protected and the importance of the item to national security and readiness. For
protection against vehicle bombs, the cost of security is generally driven by the potential loss of
human life, which frequently overrides the value of the property to be protected. Protection of
personnel is usually the primary motivating factor behind a decision to use vehicle barriers and
provide protection against terrorist vehicle bombs. No attempt is made in this handbook to quantify
the cost of human life.
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