Custom Search
|
|
|
||
 MIL-HDBK-1013/1A
2)
Military Critical Assets. Military critical assets are those
which support war-fighting capability. For example, if the facility is an
operational armory in the Middle East supporting a rapid wartime dispersal of
units, it will likely contain a predictable set of weapon types, medical
supplies, and other important supplies and equipment. Other examples of
military critical assets and facilities are shown in Figure 2. The design
team should also consult with the facility sponsor or user to determine the
type of assets to be protected.
3)
Nonappropriated Fund Assets. Nonappropriated fund assets are
those contained in commissaries, housing, or other personnel support
facilities. These assets can run the full gambit from low- to high-value
items. For the most part, the threat directed at such assets is likely to be
criminals whose objective is theft. The levels of protection required for
such assets are, thus, a strong function of their utility or economic value
to the aggressor.
4)
Personnel Assets. Each facility type will contain military
and civilian operating personnel. In this case the designer must be
concerned with the affiliation and/or rank of the personnel, since this will
directly affect the potential attacks. For example, in the Middle East,
high-ranking military personnel will be a more probable target of an
assassination or kidnapping than a foreign national working in the same
facility. The designer should consult with the facility sponsor or user to
determine the type of personnel requiring protection.
2.3.4.3
Correlate Asset to Aggressor Types. Table 3 provides a checklist
of potential aggressor types (as described in par. 2.3.2) correlated to the
general asset categories shown in Table 2. Implicit in the correlations in
Table 3 is the objective of the threat. For example, criminals are likely to
be more interested in theft of money, drugs, etc., not destruction, while
terrorists are interested in the selected destruction of military assets
rather than drugs, etc.
2.3.4.4
Correlate Attack Type and Severity to Aggressor Type. Table 4
provides a checklist of attack types and severity (as defined in Table 1) to
aggressor types. In reviewing Table 4, note that certain aggressor types are
more likely to commit to an attack at a given level of severity than other
types. For example, a casual criminal would most likely resort to a low-
level, forced-entry or ballistic attack, while a terrorist in the Middle East
might use very high-severity level, forced-entry, ballistic, standoff weapon,
or car bomb attacks. The design team should consult with operational,
security, and intelligence personnel to assess the attack likelihoods. In
this regard the following factors should be considered:
1)
The likelihood of an attack of a given severity level
occurring depends upon whether: (a) there is a past history of similar
attacks in the area, or areas elsewhere with similar geopolitical and
demographic characteristics, or (b) intelligence sources indicate a strong
possibility of
13
|
 
|
|
|
||
