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 of reporting permits a line security technique to assure proper operation of
the system report capability. The major disadvantage of the police
connection and central station options are the vulnerabilities of the
required telephone facilities. Also, many municipal police departments are
discontinuing these services due to nuisance alarm response requirements and
higher priorities on calls for service.
8.2.2.4 Proprietary. The proprietary termination option indicates the use
of an intrafacility protection scheme which relies on monitoring and
response personnel dedicated to the facility. This scheme permits a greater
definition of alarm zones since wiring of point-to-point devices is much
easier than most shared service schemes. The goal is to have detectors
provide an individual report per detection device. The improved
characteristics of information quantity, supervision of communication lines,
and processing capability demand the presence of proprietary personnel to
coordinate the response forces and provide for additional resources as
required to resolve the problem. This is the preferred method for DoD
facilities and is the method required by OPNAVINST 5530.14, U.S. Navy
Physical Security Manual, for all Navy facilities.
8.2.3 On-Site Location. Considerations for locating a control center
on-site include provisions for personnel, equipment, and procedures. The
decision is influenced by the threat analysis conclusions that indicate the
need for immediate response and resolution of alarm and event reports. High
value assets, mission criticality, remote location, directive requirements
and budgetary constraints are a few factors which indicate a proprietary or
on-site control center. The decision to provide a local on-site control
center for alarm processing will realize immediate response capability when
communications and priority controls are implemented. The trade-off for
in-house controls is the vulnerability of the control center itself. In
order to adequately address the vulnerability of the control center, it is
necessary to critically examine the need to provide this high level of
security.
8.2.3.1 Personnel. The vulnerabilities of personnel to physical attack and
compromise of duties are diminished by protecting the control center to the
same degree as the highest security application within the facility.
Comprehensive access control serves to eliminate unauthorized personnel from
the center, thus avoiding distractions and compromise of security tasks.
Although there are some cost savings and subdued image merits to the open,
"receptionist" type security control center, the mission of the security
forces is better suited to the protection afforded by a location that is out
of public access. Physical protection of the control center begins with the
limitation of public view, particularly from outside the protected
perimeter; fire detection and extinguishing equipment; duress alarms
(reporting to an off-site response force); physical (brute force) attack
protection; bullet-resistive materials; and centralized assessment and
communication systems. Comfort provisions include items which will enhance
the ability for monitoring personnel to conduct duties with the minimum of
outside influences. These considerations include heat, light,
air-conditioning, toilet facilities, human factored equipment and work
areas, and appropriate training. Adequate staffing will provide for the
proper rotation, scheduling, and relief to ensure reliability and
effectiveness of personnel.
13.02-118
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