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 In addition, at varying occurrence intervals normally dependent on FPCON, vehicles and their
contents will continue to be inspected. Monitoring and control of both inbound and outbound
traffic should be considered. If a vehicle is denied entry, during either identification check, the
access control point must be configured to allow that vehicle to be re-directed to exit the ECF
before entering the installation. It is likely that the traffic arms will be used to control traffic
when a vehicle is being rejected from the ECF. The exact types of automated equipment and
procedures used for vehicle or personnel identification is currently unknown, so it is paramount
that the layout and electrical power infrastructure remain flexible.
In the future, it is possible that the processing of visitor traffic, including the issuance of passes,
will occur at each ECF in lieu of a centralized visitor control center. Therefore, the design of
an ECF, should consider this possibility. This facility would likely support one guard with
automated equipment for issuing passes to each vehicle in the visitor queue.
3.3.3 Response Zone
The response zone is the area extending from the end of the access control zone to the
location of the final active vehicle barrier, bounded by the passive vehicle barriers, which
create containment. This zone defines the end of the ECP. The main function of the response
zone is to provide time for the security personnel to react to a threat and operate the active
vehicle barriers, closing the entry control point if necessary.
3.3.3.1
Determining Response Time and Length of Response Zone
Response time is defined as the time required for complete activation of the active vehicle
barriers once a threat is detected. The response time includes the time for security personnel
to react to a threat and initiate the activation of the barrier system and the time for the
selected barrier system to fully deploy and close the roadway. MIL-HDBK 1013/14 provides
guidance in estimating the activation time for active vehicle barrier systems and determining
the available response time for a given layout. When evaluating the adequacy of response
time and the length of the response zone, a minimum of two threat scenarios will be
considered. The first scenario is a potential terrorist vehicle approaching the entry control
facility at a moderate or high rate of speed. The attack will be detected much earlier due to
the high-speed approach; however, the high speed and subsequent acceleration may limit the
response time available. The second scenario is a potential terrorist vehicle approaching the
entry control point to attempt covert entry. The vehicle will approach at a slow speed or stop
to offer false credentials. In this scenario, the vehicle is closer to the active vehicle barrier
when detection occurs, but the vehicle has a low velocity and must accelerate towards the
barrier, increasing the time required to cover the distance. Typically, the first scenario will
control unless the initial velocity of the threat vehicle as it enters the ECF is kept low by other
design features or site characteristics. The design of the entry control point shall consider both
scenarios, determine which scenario governs, and verify the adequacy of the response time
and active vehicle barrier selected. The response time shall be maximized. In no case shall
the reaction time of the security personnel be taken less than three (3) seconds or the
deployment time of the active barrier taken less than one (1) second. This results in a minimum
of four (4) seconds of response time provided in all cases. To facilitate the evaluation, Tables
3-1 and 3-2 are provided for reference; however site-specific calculations should be
completed for each ECF. The acceleration rates used in these tables are based on the
guidance in MIL-HDBK 1013/14.
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